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Abstract
In a recently proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics, U.
Mohrhoff advocates original and thought-provoking views on space
and time, the definition of macroscopic objects, and the meaning of
probability statements. The interpretation also addresses a number of
questions about factual events and the nature of reality. The purpose
of this note is to examine several issues raised by Mohrhoff’s inter-
pretation, and to assess whether it helps providing solutions to the
long-standing problems of quantum mechanics.
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1 Introduction
More than 75 years after quantum mechanics was proposed and the wave
function given a probabilistic interpretation, the issue of interpreting the
theory is anything but settled. The past 25 years have witnessed, among
other avenues, the revival of Bohmian mechanics [1, 2, 3], the development of
decoherence theory [4], the consistent histories approach [5, 6], spontaneous
localization theories [7], the evolution of the modal interpretation [8, 9], and
the idea of a veiled reality [10].
The main question all these approaches try to answer is the following:
How can one reconcile the apparently indeterminate nature of quantum ob-
servables with the apparently determinate nature of classical observables, if
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the latter are reduced to the former? The question shows up most spectacu-
larly in the so-called quantum measurement problem, recognized early after
the advent of quantum mechanics [11]. It is also deeply connected with the
meaning of probability statements.
A new and original way of looking at these problems has, in the past few
years, been proposed by U. Mohrhoff.1 Like the Copenhagen interpretation,
with which it shares a number of characteristics, it aims at “an interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics that takes standard quantum mechanics to be
fundamental and complete.” [13, p. 6] But it goes beyond the Copenhagen
interpretation in making rather striking proposals on several most fundamen-
tal issues, among them the structure of space-time, the nature of physical
reality, and the meaning of objective probability.
This paper is a critical examination of a number of assertions made in
Mohrhoff’s interpretation, together with an analysis of their consequences.
The various questions addressed here do not cover all aspects of the inter-
pretation, which partakes of a wide-ranging system that reaches well into
metaphysical ontology. The questions I investigate, however, carry much
of the interpretation’s specific answers to the problem of making sense of
quantum mechanics.
Mohrhoff’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is briefly summarized
in the following section. Next I examine a number of issues it raises in
connection with the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule, the quantum
state, and factual reality. I will try to assess whether the interpretation
provides acceptable solutions to the problems of quantum mechanics, and
the extent to which the proposed solutions are compulsory.
2 Outline of Mohrhoff’s interpretation
It is impossible in just a few pages to really do justice to Mohrhoff’s rich and
complex interpretation. This section accordingly brings up those concepts
and issues that subsequently will be the subject of analysis.
Central to Mohrhoff’s interpretation is the belief, which he also finds in
Mermin [18], “that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be reduced to
the single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities.” [12, p. 728]
As a matter of fact, the idea that understanding quantum mechanics requires
1Most relevant to the present discussion are Refs. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Others can
be found in the e-print archives http://arXiv.org.
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understanding probability goes back at least to Popper [19], who for that
purpose introduced his “propensity” interpretation of probability. Mohrhoff,
however, views the problem differently. For him, objective probabilities must
be assigned on the basis of all relevant facts, and this is done by the use of
the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule [20].
The ABL rule can be formulated as follows. Let A, C, and B be three
observables, pertaining to a system S, which for our purposes can be taken as
nondegenerate. At time t1, S is prepared in an eigenstate |a〉 of A. At time
t > t1, the observable C is measured and one of the results cj is obtained.
Finally, at time t2 > t, B is measured and the result b is found. Then the
probability that ci is obtained at t, conditional upon the preparation of |a〉
at t1 and the result b at t2, is given by
2
PABL(ci) =
|〈b|ci〉〈ci|a〉|
2
∑
j |〈b|cj〉〈cj|a〉|
2
. (1)
Ket |b〉 is the eigenvector of B associated with b and the sum on j runs over
all eigenvalues of C. Here and elsewhere, all kets are assumed normalized.
How can the ABL rule be used to compute objective probabilities? Ac-
cording to Mohrhoff, probabilities of different outcomes are objective only if
they are based on all relevant facts, past, present, and future. Thus if C is
measured, and the result ci is found, then the objective probability of ci is
trivially one and the probability of cj for j 6= i vanishes. Nontrivial objective
probabilities can therefore only be assigned to measurements that are not
performed. That is, they are assigned counterfactually. The ABL rule pro-
vides objective probabilities if it is interpreted as giving the probability of ci
at t, on the conditions that (i) S is prepared in |a〉 at t1, (ii) no measurement
is made between t1 and t2, and (iii) S is found in |b〉 at t2.
The Born probability of ci can also be defined as |〈ci|a〉|
2. But in the
present context, it is subjective, inasmuch as it does not take into account
the (later) result b. The Born probability is objective only if no measurement
is performed on S after its preparation at t1.
In general, the ABL rule (as well as the Born rule if no measurement is
performed after t1) objectively assigns nontrivial probabilities to various pos-
sible results cj. This, so the argument goes, has far-reaching consequences.
2With kets in the Schro¨dinger picture, the Hamiltonian is assumed to vanish between t1
and t2. Equation (1) also holds for a nonvanishing Hamiltonian, provided the Heisenberg
picture is used instead.
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“The objectivity of quantum-mechanical probabilities [. . . ] entails that the
contingent properties of material objects are extrinsic rather than intrin-
sic.” [12, p. 728] Extrinsic properties “supervene on what happens or is the
case in the rest of the world.” [15, p. 869] In between preparation and mea-
surement or, more generally, outside the context of a property-indicating
fact, no quantum observable has a value. This “nonvaluedness” holds also in
the case where the objective probability of a given result is one.3 That is, one
cannot assign an ontological “element of reality” to a quantum observable
even if its objective (ABL or Born) probability is one.4
Facts, it turns out, are fundamental in Mohrhoff’s interpretation. A typ-
ical fact (or matter of fact, actual event, or state of affairs) is the click of
a Geiger counter. “Quantum mechanics always presupposes, and therefore
never allows us to infer, the existence of a fact that indicates the alternative
taken.” [12, p. 733, original emphasized] Facts are uncaused and irreducible.
Quantum mechanics can, for instance, give the subjective Born probability
that ci is found at t if S is prepared at t1 and if a C-indicating fact occurs
at t. But it cannot predict, either categorically or probabilistically, that such
a fact will indeed occur.
The genuine nonvaluedness of quantum observables applies in particular
to space and time. Hence it should come as no surprise that “[t]he prob-
lem of understanding quantum mechanics is in large measure the problem of
finding appropriate ways of thinking about the spatial and temporal aspects
of the physical world.” [14, p. 2] Space, for instance, has physical reality
only if evinced by a position-indicating fact. In the two-slit experiment, the
conceptual distinction we make between two regions of space does not exist
for the electron unless a fact (e.g. a measurement successfully performed)
indicates it. Such a fact will not in general indicate the position with arbi-
trary precision. The position of a quantum object therefore only exists when
warranted by a fact, and then only within the limit where it is indeed war-
3“Nonvaluedness” is introduced here with a meaning akin to Mohrhoff’s “fuzziness.”
Both terms pertain to a quantum observable in between measurements. Fuzziness, how-
ever, specifically applies to the case where the objective probability of at least two results
differs from zero.
4Elements of reality were introduced by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in their seminal
1935 paper [21]. Following Mohrhoff, I use the characterization given by M. Redhead [22,
p. 72]: “If we can predict with certainty, or at any rate with probability one, the result
of measuring a physical quantity at time t, then at the time t there exists an element of
reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted
measurement result.”
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ranted. “[T]he standard, substantival, set-theoretic conception of space is as
inconsistent with quantum mechanics as absolute simultaneity is with special
relativity.” [14, p. 3] Space as an infinitely-differentiated objectively-existing
manifold where events occur is simply a fiction. The same applies to time.
Outside the context of a moment-indicating fact, time does not exist.
The nonexistence of time as an objective one-dimensional continuum, to-
gether with the nonvaluedness of all quantum observables outside the context
of facts, leads Mohrhoff to conclude that there is no such thing as an evolving
quantum state. The “state vector” |ψ(t)〉 (or the density operator ρ(t)) is
strictly a tool used to compute either the subjective probability of various
results at t if a fact occurs at t, or the objective probability of results at t if no
fact occurs at t. It does not represent the time evolution of a state because
(i) a state and a probability measure are logically different categories; (ii)
there is no time t if there is no fact at t; and (iii) no observable (even one
which has |ψ(t)〉 as eigenvector) has a value unless the value is indicated by
a fact. The last two reasons are related, for “[t]he insufficiency of Redhead’s
‘sufficiency condition’ [for the existence of an element of reality] hinges on the
nonexistence of the particular time t in the absence of an actual measurement
performed at the time t. [14, p. 23]
3 The ABL rule
The ABL rule was formulated in the previous section. It turns out that the
rule can be interpreted in two very different ways. The two interpretations
refer to different contexts, and as such are not mutually contradictory.
Suppose that S (i) is prepared in |a〉 at t1, (ii) undergoes a measurement
of C at t, and (iii) undergoes a measurement of B at t2 with the result
b. Following the notation of Ref. [23], we shall call this an A → C → B
context. In that context, the ABL rule can be interpreted as giving the
subjective probabilities of various results of the measurement of C. That the
ABL rule means at least this much is uncontroversial.
Suppose now that S (i) is prepared in |a〉 at t1, (ii) undergoes no mea-
surement between t1 and t2, and (iii) undergoes a measurement of B at t2
with the result b. This we shall call an A→ B context. In that context, the
ABL rule can be interpreted as asserting something at t about an observable
C that has not been measured. This interpretation is controversial. It was
not explicitly asserted by the original proponents of the rule [20], although
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one of them later held that they had indeed meant so [24].
What can be said in general about the second interpretation? From a
purely logical point of view, it should be clear that one cannot, from uncon-
troversial factual properties of C in an A→ C → B context, infer anything
factual about C in an A → B context. For example, if C coincides with A,
one cannot from the assertion that A is a at t in an A → A → B context
infer a value for A at t in an A→ B context. Nevertheless, various theories
(or theory interpretations) can make claims about ontological properties of
C in an A→ B context. They can, for instance, make assertions about the
“true value” of C. It is obvious that such claims are absolutely untestable,
since a test would involve measuring C, thereby landing in an A→ C → B
context. This, however, does not imply that these claims have no meaning
(for people other than strict empiricists, at least) or are not interesting.
In quantum mechanics, it cannot be maintained that C has a true value
(equal to one of its eigenvalues) revealed in and unaffected by a measurement.
This is a direct consequence of the formalism and holds in any interpretation
whatsoever. Indeed if C had such a true value unaffected by measurement,
the probability of b conditional on a would be given by
P (b|a) =
∑
i
P (b|ci)P (ci|a). (2)
But in quantum mechanics P (b|a) = |〈b|a〉|2, with similar formulas for P (b|ci)
and P (ci|a). These probabilities do not, in general, satisfy (2).
We should note that in an A → B context, quantum mechanics can
consistently (although not compulsorily) be interpreted as asserting that the
observable A has a true value equal to a between t1 and t2. That true value
corresponds to Redhead’s elements of reality. Now the Born and ABL rules
are symmetric under the interchange of a and b. This suggests also asserting
that the observable B has a true value equal to b between t1 and t2. If both
assertions are maintained, quantum mechanics must be an incomplete theory,
because if observables A and B do not commute, eigenvectors of one are not
in general eigenvectors of the other. We shall see, however, that there are
good (though again not compelling) reasons for maintaining that A has and
B does not have a true value between t1 and t2.
In hidden variable theories, nothing in principle prevents C, in an A→ B
context, from having a true value at all times between t1 and t2. Take for
instance Bohmian mechanics. If |a〉 and |b〉 are not position eigenstates, then
A and B do not commute with the position operator X . Yet the particle’s
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position is well-defined at all times between t1 and t2. In an A → X → B
context, however, positions would be different. The measurement of X at
t would from then on change the particle’s wave function, and therefore its
Bohmian trajectory.
Let us now examine how does Mohrhoff’s interpretation of quantum me-
chanics fit in the present discussion of the ABL rule. In his exchange with
R. E. Kastner [15, 25], Mohrhoff explains how to quantitatively define the
counterfactual meaning of the ABL rule. To paraphrase him, saying that
PABL(ci) is the objective probability with which ci would be obtained, given
preparation |a〉 and measurement b at t1 and t2, is “in all relevant aspects
exactly the same as saying that” PABL(ci) is the subjective probability with
which ci is obtained given the same outcomes at t1 and t2 [15, p. 868]. The
relevant aspects here are the quantitative ones. As pointed out in section 2,
however, it is clear that Mohrhoff has much more to say about the ontological
consequences of the counterfactual meaning. The implications are that the
observable C categorically has no value between t1 and t2 in an A→ B con-
text. Recall that an observable has a value only when the value is ascertained
by a fact. The subjective (uncontroversial) meaning of the ABL rule, which
“in all relevant [quantitative] aspects” coincides with the objective (counter-
factual) meaning, is held to entail an objective nonvaluedness of C in the
A → B context. It should be stressed once more that the nonvaluedness
does not logically follow from the counterfactual meaning of the ABL rule.
It is, nonetheless, a possible (and certainly a significant) interpretation based
upon it.
The ABL rule, written as in (1), appears invariant under time reversal.
Indeed let the signs of t1, t, and t2 be changed and let bras be transformed into
kets under time reversal. Then the ABL rule is transformed into itself. But
suppose the process of measurement, instead of occurring at a single instant,
is spread over some interval of time. The time-reversal invariance of the ABL
rule then depends on the time-reversal properties of the measurement process.
This has been stressed by L. Vaidman [26] as far as the C measurement
goes. Similar considerations can be made for the initial preparation (a) and
final measurement (b). In the case where the time reversal of preselection is
postselection and where the C measurement is time-reversal invariant, then
the ABL rule is also time-reversal invariant. But this does not have to be
so. Take for instance von Neumann’s theory of measurement [11]. In that
approach, a measurement is an interaction followed by a collapse, a complex
process that can be symbolized as Int(C) → (C : ci). The A → C → B
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process can then schematically be represented as
Int(A)→ (A : a)→ Int(C)→ (C : ci)→ Int(B)→ (B : b). (3)
This is certainly not time-reversal invariant. For the purpose of computing
probabilities of measurement results at time t, state |a〉 and state |b〉 are
equally useful. Fot the purpose of making ontological statements, however,
it is more natural in the absence of a C measurement to hold that |a〉, rather
than |b〉, is the intermediate state, since |b〉 obtains only after an intervening
interaction.
In Mohrhoff’s interpretation, however, the time-reversal invariance of the
ABL rule can be held consistently. The reason is that in this framework,
measurements should not be analyzed, as they are irreducible facts. This
raises questions of its own, to which we shall come back later on.
4 The quantum state
I have already pointed out that Mohrhoff categorically denies that the “state
vector” |ψ(t)〉 represents an evolving quantum state. “The idea that what by
definition is a tool for assigning probabilities to possibilities also describes an
actual state of affairs, is simply a category mistake.” [14, p. 22] Most people
will agree, so the argument goes, that |ψ(t)〉 represents a probability mea-
sure, that it yields the probability of various results on the condition that a
measurement is performed. But if no measurement is performed, no observ-
able has a value. A state and a probability measure are two entirely different
objects. Identifying one with the other is therefore logically inconsistent.
I shall argue that such a strong claim is unfounded. Nevertheless, it is
entirely consistent (though not compulsory) to deny the existence of an evolv-
ing quantum state. This is in fact an interpretative statement. Although it
does bring substantial benefits, it also carries problems of its own.
The greatest benefit reaped in denying the existence of an evolving quan-
tum state is that the ominous quantum measurement problem is, if not com-
pletely solved, at least considerably attenuated. In broad outline the mea-
surement problem goes as follows. An observable A with eigenvectors |ai〉
and (say) nondegenerate eigenvalues ai, pertaining to a quantum system S,
is subject to a measurement by an apparatusM . The apparatus is also to be
treated quantum mechanically. It starts in some initial state |α0〉. Suppose
the quantum system is prepared in a state |aj〉. A reliable apparatus should
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be built so that after suitable interaction between S and M (associated with
a unitary operator U), the “pointer” of the apparatus shows a characteristic
value αj , corresponding to a state |αj〉. Readings αi and αj (i 6= j) are un-
ambiguous provided that |αi〉 and |αj〉 are macroscopically distinct. But now
suppose that the quantum system is prepared in a nontrivial superposition∑
k ck|ak〉 of eigenstates of A. Then the linearity of the evolution operator
implies that after interaction, the joint quantum state of the system and
apparatus is given by
|χ〉 =
∑
k
ck|ak〉 ⊗ |αk〉. (4)
This result seems to be flatly ruled out by experiment, inasmuch as no appa-
ratus is ever observed in a superposition of macroscopically distinct pointer
states.
To derive this contradiction, it is crucial to view the state vector (4) as
indeed representing a state, that is, an objectively existing state of affairs.
Only then has the experimental observation any relevance in ruling it out. If
instead |χ〉 represents a probability measure for results αk on the condition
that one of them shows up, the contradiction is removed.
There still remains, however, what is known as the “pointer problem.”
In (4), the |αk〉 make up an orthonormal set of eigenvectors of an observable
in the apparatus’s Hilbert space, which may be denoted by A. Let {|βl〉} be
another orthonormal set, related to the first one by some unitary operator.
The |βl〉 can be thought of as eigenvectors of some (nonunique) operator B.
One can write
|χ〉 =
∑
l
c′l|bl〉 ⊗ |βl〉. (5)
The |bl〉 are called “relative states.” [27] They are (in general nonorthogonal)
linear combinations of the |ak〉.
The pointer problem is encapsulated in the following question: What,
from a fundamental point of view, makes vectors |αk〉 more relevant than
vectors |βl〉? Decoherence theory [4] attempts to answer the question by
bringing up effects of the environment. Barring that, the |αk〉 are singled
out by the following mathematical criterion: in general they are the only
ones for which the relative states |ak〉 are orthogonal
5 and, therefore, are the
eigenstates of a Hermitian operator.
5It is well-known that the biorthogonal decomposition (4) is unique if all ck have dif-
ferent norms.
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This criterion may be related to what Mohrhoff has in mind when he
states that Born probabilities are conditional, among other things, on “the
observable [A] that is being measured.” [14, p. 26] Whether this solves the
pointer problem is, however, far from carrying consensus. Mohrhoff’s inter-
pretation does not seem to bring any additional insight to the issue.
To sum up, denying that the state vector represents an evolving quantum
state considerably weakens the measurement problem, in a consistent way.
Nevertheless, we shall see that from a logical point of view, this stand is by
no means compelling.
It is true that a state description and a probability measure specify dis-
tinct classes of objects. But these classes are not mutually exclusive, anymore
than in mathematics, for instance, the class of topological spaces excludes the
class of groups. Perhaps one can argue that it is intuitively strange to endow
a probability measure with properties of a state description. The converse,
however, is not strange at all. Indeed there are good reasons to believe that
if the state (i.e. the actual state of affairs) is known, predictions of some sort
can be made as regards results of measurements. This is trivially true, for
example, in classical mechanics. There the state is specified by a point in
phase space at some time t. From this specification, a (trivial) probability
measure can be defined on possible states at time t′.
Nor does the requirement of collapse, in theories or interpretations in
which it occurs, make the notion of an evolving state inconsistent. Clearly, if
one is willing to contemplate deviations from Schro¨dinger evolution, numer-
ous collapse models are possible that may have various degrees of likeliness.
But even if one insists that the Schro¨dinger equation holds exactly, behavior
akin to collapse is possible, as Bohmian mechanics clearly, and decoherence
theory more controversially, illustrate.
I should point out that there are good (though again not compelling)
reasons to view the state vector as specifying an evolving state. Let system S
be prepared at time t1 in the state |ψ(t1)〉. The preparation being ascertained
by a fact, it is agreed that at time t1, S possesses the property associated
with the projector |ψ(t1)〉〈ψ(t1)|. Assume the system’s Hamiltonian is known
in the time interval (t1, t2). Then in principle, the state vector |ψ(t)〉 is also
known at any t between t1 and t2. Hence one can predict with certainty that a
measurement, at time t, of the property associated with the projector Pψ(t) =
|ψ(t)〉〈ψ(t)| will yield the value one. In Redhead’s language, Pψ(t) = 1 is a
(time-dependent) element of reality. This possibility of correctly predicting
the value of a time-dependent dynamical variable motivates the association
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of the state vector with an actual state of affairs.6
Mohrhoff rightly points out that no detector is 100% efficient. The same
applies to preparation devices. A preparation device may not always pre-
pare anything, or it may prepare something slightly different from what is
intended. Thus in the real world one may be wrong when one assigns an el-
ement of reality. Yet one can consistently maintain that there is an element
of reality in, say, 99% of cases. In investigating the extent to which facts
do or do not have causes, it may help to remember that the inefficiency of
preparation devices is irrelevant to the existence or nonexistence of elements
of reality.
5 Macroscopic objects and facts
In Mohrhoff’s interpretation, the formalism of quantum mechanics is taken
to hold exactly. Hence it should apply to everything, including macroscopic
objects.
How are macroscopic objects to be defined? We have seen that no object
(whatever its size) has a position unless that position is indicated by a fact.
A fact will occur in relation with a detector that can monitor the object’s
position up to a certain precision. Now the bigger an object is, the slower
the wave packet associated with its center-of-mass position will spread (the
spreading goes roughly as m−1, where m is the object’s mass). Hence for
large objects, center-of-mass positions (or indeed center-of-mass positions of
their parts) have very little time to become appreciably fuzzy between two
successive position-indicating facts. That very small fuzziness, to show itself,
requires a much bigger detector that can monitor positions with very high
precision. The bigger detector’s position still has a residual, exceedingly
small fuzziness, which however can only be revealed by still another, this
time exceedingly large, detector. Clearly, in the actual world, this process
cannot go on forever. Detectors cannot be arbitrarily large, if only to be
stable against gravitational collapse. The upshot is that there are objects so
6“As my aim here is to make sense of standard quantum mechanics, I take the nonex-
istence of hidden variables for granted.” [14, p. 16] If elements of reality are reckoned to
be outside the formalism of quantum mechanics, this statement eliminates them tautolog-
ically. What is really significant, I believe, is that elements of reality and hidden variables
can be introduced while in no way changing the Schro¨dinger equation, the association of
measurement results with eigenvalues of Hermitian operators, or the Born rule.
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large that no detector exists to reveal the fuzziness of their position. These
are, by definition, macroscopic objects.
It is experimentally well established that, with one type of exception, bulk
properties of macroscopic objects follow the laws of classical mechanics. The
exception occurs, of course, when the macroscopic object is used as a pointer
to indicate the unpredictable value of a microscopic object’s observable. But
barring that, classical mechanics provides an entirely adequate description of
things like footballs and planets. Now these are also subject to the laws of
quantum mechanics, inasmuch as the latter apply to everything. Can the two
laws be made consistent? There are strong (although not yet entirely com-
pelling, see [6]) indications that if a macroscopic object is treated quantum
mechanically, then quantum observables can be defined whose probabilis-
tic behavior follows very closely the classical behavior of associated classical
observables. Is this enough to conclude that classical mechanics, now un-
derstood as the causal description of the succession of facts, is reducible to
quantum mechanics? Not so for Mohrhoff.
The reason is that quantum mechanics never predicts the occurrence of
a fact. On the basis of facts, it predicts the probability of various results if
an additional fact occurs. But then, what is the precise nature of a fact?
Mohrhoff does give some answers to this question. He points out that
facts play in quantum mechanics a role similar to initial conditions in clas-
sical mechanics. “While in classical physics actuality attaches itself to a
nomologically possible world trivially through the initial conditions, in quan-
tum physics it ‘pops up’ unpredictably and inexplicably with every property-
defining fact.” [12, p. 729] As initial conditions are always assumed and never
explained, so should facts be. “[T]he existence of facts—the factuality of
events or states of affairs—cannot be accounted for, anymore than we can
explain why there is anything at all, rather than nothing.” [16, p. 221]
It would seem that in some circumstances, the occurrence of a fact can be
predicted, if not through quantum mechanics, at least empirically. Take for
instance a Geiger counter together with a device that can prepare a charged
particle with a position and speed as well-defined as Heisenberg’s principle
allows. At t1 the particle is emitted towards the counter with a speed set so
that it arrives at t2. Here t1 and t2 are defined in terms of nearby macroscopic
clocks. With this setup one can predict, with a high degree of probability,
that the counter will click at t2.
It turns out, however, that things are more complicated. The situation
just described does not evince a unique fact. Before and after the click one
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can, within the finite time differentiation allowed by available clocks, repeat-
edly and positively ascertain that there is no click. All these “nonclicks” are
facts. When the charged particle enters the Geiger counter, the particle’s
and counter’s wave functions become entangled, and there is a growing prob-
ability for click rather than nonclick. I agree with Mohrhoff that standard
quantum mechanics is of no help in predicting when precisely will the click
occur.
It is entirely consistent to view the occurrence of facts as uncaused and
unpredictable. From an epistemological point of view, however, it is risky.
Classical mechanics does not explain initial conditions, but it explains every-
thing else. That is, the totality of the world at one instant is unexplained,
but the totality of the world at all other instants is explained. Mohrhoff tells
us that in quantum mechanics, all the facts that constantly betoken positions
of macroscopic objects should be taken as unexplainable. It seems that the
unexplained here far exceeds what it is in classical mechanics. Inevitably,
people will look for regularities in the occurrence of facts (beyond the consis-
tency of classical trajectories with quantum-mechanical probabilities). In a
sense, spontaneous localization theory [7] may be viewed as doing just that.
It may or may not be successful. But, as pointed out in Ref. [28], any theory
that would correctly account for the occurrence of facts would, other things
being equal, have a head start over one that does not.
Other properties of facts may be subject to experimental investigation
and, therefore, call for theoretical analysis. A fact occurs every time when,
for instance, a detector clicks or a pointer deflects. It is crucial to observe
that the fact does not coincide with the pointer’s position. [14, p. 31] The
latter is, ultimately, a quantum observable subject to a fuzziness that is just
too small for a suitable detector to evince it. But the former is not a quantum
observable (it allows assigning values to quantum observables), and it is not
subject to fuzziness. Now it will presumably be agreed that a 1 kg detector
can register a fact. What about smaller detectors? Can a 1 g detector register
a fact, or a 1 µg detector, or a smaller one? Is a detector required to have
some minimum mass to be able to work as a detector? If the answer is yes,
that mass ought to be open to investigation.
But perhaps the answer is no. Maybe even atoms or elementary particles
can work as detectors. Then another question comes up. Consider a hydrogen
atom in a 2p state, confined in a high vacuum. In a split second the atom
is very likely to emit a 1216 A˚ photon and fall to the ground state. Perhaps
one will maintain that when the photon has gone far enough, a fact has
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occurred. But then the question is, When did the fact occur? It won’t help
to say that time for the atom is not defined outside the context of the fact,
for the occurrence can be referred to a nearby macroscopic clock. A matter
of fact “is something that cannot be undone or ‘erased’.” [13, p. 18] If it
is agreed that the fact has already occurred at t = 1 s (as shown by the
macroscopic clock), it must have occurred at some instant between t = 0 and
t = 1 s. That instant is defined as the one starting from which it is impossible
to undo or erase. Some way or other, it ought to be open to experimental
investigation.
6 Discussion
The interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by U. Mohrhoff bears
resemblance to the Copenhagen interpretation. It takes quantum mechanics
to be fundamental and complete, and it requires the validity of classical me-
chanics for its formulation. In both the state vector is a tool for calculating
probabilities. Yet Mohrhoff’s interpretation goes beyond the Copenhagen
interpretation in several ways. It applies not only to measurements in the
strict sense, but to all property-indicating facts. Moreover, it does not share
the Copenhagen interpretation’s strict instrumentalism. Far from remain-
ing silent about the behavior of quantum observables in between measure-
ments, it explicitly asserts their fuzziness or nonvaluedness or, equivalently,
the meaninglessness of their having a value. That nonvaluedness applies most
importantly to space and time, which are undefined outside the context of
measurements or facts. “The seemingly intractable problem of understand-
ing quantum mechanics is a consequence of our dogged insistence on obtrud-
ing onto the world, not a spatiotemporal framework, but a spatiotemporal
framework that is more detailed than the world.” [12, p. 742]
Probability statements have a very specific meaning in Mohrhoff’s in-
terpretation. Objective statements apply counterfactually to measurements
that are not performed. Subjective statements are rational guesses made
on the basis of incomplete information, in particular if the result of an ac-
tually performed measurement is not known. The “state vector” is viewed
strictly as a probability measure, and emphatically not as representing an
evolving quantum state. This goes a long way towards solving the quantum
measurement problem. It remains, however, an interpretational statement,
not logically implied by the formalism of quantum mechanics. The same
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holds for the rejection of elements of reality and the assertion of an objective
nonvaluedness in between measurements or facts.
Mohrhoff presents a view of macroscopic objects that carries much ap-
peal. To them quantum mechanics applies universally and exactly. Their
positions are quantum observables, qualitatively subject to fuzziness just
like observables associated with microscopic objects. Quantitatively, how-
ever, the fuzziness is exceedingly small, in effect so small that there are no
detectors large enough to evince it. That view of macroscopic objects should,
I believe, be investigated further. The notion that an object’s position always
shows up through another object’s fuzzy position may entail consequences
otherwise not so easily uncovered.
Outside the explanatory scheme of quantum mechanics are facts, which
are uncaused and unpredictable. Quantum mechanics predicts the probabil-
ity of measurement results on the condition that a fact occurs, but it says
nothing about the occurrence itself. This raises questions about the nature
of facts and the extent to which they can be experimentally investigated as
well as theoretically analyzed. These questions, although framed in a differ-
ent setup, are related to the ones often asked about the frontier between the
quantum and the classical.
In the semantic view of scientific theories [8], a theory is identified with the
class of its models or interpretations. Each model answers the question, How
can the world be the way the theory says it is? The models collectively give
meaning to the theory. In the interpretation he has put forth, Mohrhoff has
shown us a thought-provoking and original view of the way that, according
to quantum mechanics, the world can be.
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